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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 981513-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant, John Richard Kocher, appeals from a judgment of conviction for 
exercising unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1996), and interference with 
a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-305 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the 
respective standards of appellate review: 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for the unauthorized 
control over a motor vehicle? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of a claim that the evidence is not 
sufficient to support a jury verdict is narrow. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985). The appellate court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983). An appellate court will "reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." Id.; see also Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
for a mistrial after a State witness inadvertently referred to defendant's possession of stolen 
checks? 
Standard of Review. The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial lies within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367,369, 517 P.2d 1322, 
1324 (Utah 1974), and the appellate court "will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion 
for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 
1997). Moreover, the appellate court "review[s] such a decision with just deference because 
of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in 
the courtroom on the total proceedings, and this is especially so when what actually occurred 
is in dispute." Id. at 1231. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are IK 4 dctci niiiiui 11 \ i 
-( flic i*|ipc.il MI \\ , nli ,! imp. n Mm . I 11 it i| >ptB. il - • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information wit i 
degree Oloin in \ milium ul I li.ih ( nik Ann, § 76-6-404(1995); (2)purchase,possession, 
or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1995); (3) unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in viV ... ) 
interfere peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). R. 3-7, On defendant's motion, count II charging 
defendant with the purchase, possession, or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person was 
severed and ticfetiu.u,; \\A\ tnu,l !.\ i , • uv: wnumuv \l\wx: VPI.HU \\ "'* ™," !0X ":,i 
After receiving a lesser included instruction, R. 66; R. 108:278-79, the jury acquitted 
defendant of theft of a motor vehicle and returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included 
offense of unlawful control over a motor vehicle, i s'utii v "ode Ann, >,- -i i i a I '•» i i i; I ww;,j R. 
$ verdicts of guilty on the remaining two counts which 
have not been challenged on appeal. R. 82-83,108: 322-23. The court sentenced defendant 
to serve an indeterminate term not to exceed one year for unlawful control over a motor 
vehicle, K, H{K 10 " I,! \>. Defendant timely filed a notice ol appeal I. "'^  
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Taking of the Car. Ken Troester and his wife, Tamera, owned a 1995 Monte Carlo 
which was predominantly driven by Mrs. Troester. R. 108: 123-24. Mr. Troester testified 
that the car had been stolen on April 12,1997 while his wife was using the car. R. 108:125. 
Mrs. Troester had explained to her husband that she had left the keys in the car with the car 
running. R. 108: 125. Mr. Troester had never authorized defendant to use the car. R. 108: 
123. 
That morning, some time before 10:25 a.m., Cari Reeves was sitting in her car at a 
Circle K in West Valley City waiting for her daughter to come out of the store. R. 108:128, 
173-74, 242. Ms. Reeves was parked facing the Circle K next to a green car parked to her 
left. R. 108:128-29. As she waited for her daughter, Ms. Reeves observed defendant "come 
out of nowhere," get into the green car, and leave. R. 108: 130. 
Defendant did not come out of the Circle K, but approached the car from the rear. R. 
108: 129. Defendant walked between the two cars toward the Circle K as if he were going 
into the store. Id. However, he then stopped, turned around, and looked into the green car 
through the passenger window. R. 108:129,133-34. Defendant then very "casually" walked 
around the rear of the vehicle to the driver's side of the car and got in. R. 108:129-30. Once 
in the car, defendant hurriedly backed out—without looking to see if anyone was behind him 
and in a fashion that caused the tires to squeal. R. 108: 130, 134-35. Defendant took about 
one minute from the time he walked between the two vehicles until he entered the Troester's 
car and drove away. R. 108: 134. 
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Earlier that morning, defendant had gone to his friend's house near llie i ink' k in 
WVsl \'iiili"\ Hh "In ic lie hrrjiinr1 iiifiiMii .itrii mi ini'lliMiiiphtMainiiii I1' M)K' *M(i MO. 
While at his friend's house, defendant reportedly received an emergency page from his 
girlfriend, Stacy Nelson, from the home of her friend, Tiffany Farnsworth, in Salt Lake City.1 
R 108 216 1 ) , 225 Defendant testified that he had no vehicle, and because 1 le w as so high, 
h • N-- . * • J 6 : 2 3 6 . 
However, when defendant got to the Circle K near his friend's home, he saw the Troesters' 
parked car running in idle so he stopped, got into the car, and drove to Ms. Farnsworth's 
reside! I ::e ii istead R 108:23 7. . ' ' '• •. • • . • 
Search for Defendant. After defendant drove away, Ms. Reeves entered the Circle K 
because she believed defendant had just stolen the car. R. 108:130. Upon entering the store, 
Ms. Reeves observed a woman in the store who she guessed had just noticed that her car was 
g s. 
Reeves entered the store and so she gave police a description of defendant, i^. * ^ .
 A„l. 
Officer Daniel Delao from the West Valley City Police Department arrived at the Circle K 
defendant argued at trial that his taking of the Troesters' car was justified as a 
result of his concern for Ms. Nelson's safety. R. 108: 304-05; see also Instruction No. 22, 
R. 69. The defense put on evidence that defendant's girlfriend was being threatened by 
certain members of an organization called the Sundowners with whom she previously 
associated in connection with her methamphetamine use. R. 108:206,209-10. The 
defense elicited testimony that defendant and his girlfriend developed an emergency 
pager system using the numbers "9-1 1 to contact defendant if there was an emergency. 
R. 108: 210-11 Ms. Nelson claimed that she received voice mail after voice mail 
containing threats, and, as a result, she and others paged defendant several times that 
morning. R. 108: 212-14, 216. 
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at 10:25 a.m. on a reported auto theft. R. 108: 147, 173. Upon arrival, Officer Delao met 
with Mrs. Troester who he identified as the victim. R. 108: 147-48. 
Based on information obtained from Mrs. Troester, Officer Delao put out an A.T.L. 
(attempt to locate) on the Troester's car. R. 108: 148. In addition to the car, Mrs. Troester 
told Officer Delao that a cell phone had also been taken (the phone had been left in the 
vehicle in plain sight). R. 108:148. When Officer Delao called Mrs. Troester's cell number, 
he heard heavy metal rock music and what sounded like someone dialing. R. 108: 149. 
Officer Delao could not understand what was said on the other end and the call was then 
disconnected. R. 108: 150. 
Officer Delao next contacted someone from Mrs. Troester's cellular phone company 
who identified a telephone number, which was subsequently matched to a Salt Lake City 
address, that had been repeatedly dialed from Mrs. Troester's cell phone within the last 
couple of minutes. R. 108: 150. The Salt Lake City address was the location of the home 
of Ms. Farnsworth, the friend of defendant's girlfriend. R. 108:217-19. Officer Delao drove 
to within a few houses of Ms. Farnsworth's home in Salt Lake City where he met with 
Officer Aylor from the Salt Lake City Police Department. R. 108: 152. Officer Delao saw 
the Troesters' car parked at the Salt Lake City address and observed defendant get into the 
driver's side of the car. R. 108: 153. 
Capture of Defendant. When defendant got into the Troesters' car, the officers drove 
their vehicles into the driveway to block defendant's egress from the driveway. R. 108:154-
55. Defendant did not respond to the officers' commands to put his hands on his head and 
6 
h\ )ln|i !'" | n " ! ^ ' ' I I M I M I I iilLrlriiiJaiii \ l q i pa i mil of lliu un and .luulh, icfuMk ill l imn 
the officers ' ' officer \ > loi i insi iccessfully ait *mpted to deploy his 
OC spray (a derivative of cayenne pepper), defendant fled on foot until he was grabbed by 
Officer Delao while attempting to climb a fence. P. 108:158-59. Defendant continued to 
r e 
ground and stop resisting, R. 108: 160, 163. During the struggle, which lasted six to seven 
minutes, Officer Delao seized a gun from the back of defendant's waistline. R 108: 161, 
164. Defendant hit Officer Delao and repeatedly grabbed for his legs. Officer Aylor 
several times before they were able to subdue defendant and effect his arrest. R. 108: 160-
65. Upon a search of defendant following his arrest, officers found a hypodermic needle2 and 
a white plastic baggie containing a rock-like substance later identified as methamphetamine.3 
R. 108; 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant argues that because Mrs. Troester did not 
t • v, 
defendant argues that the State failed to establish that defendant did not have permission to 
use the vehicle. Defendant's claim is without merit. The testimony presented by the State, 
2The hypodermic needle u>nA 7. 
3Officer Delao testified that he also found two books of stolen checks. However , 
this statement was ordered stricken and the ju ry was instructed to disregard reference to 
the stolen checks. R ma-i*7.*9. 
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and the reasonable inferences drawn from that testimony, provided more than sufficient 
evidence to establish that defendant took the vehicle without the consent of the Troesters. 
Defendant's behavior when he first observed the car to the time he squealed out of the 
parking lot was not consistent with someone who had permission to take the car. There was 
no evidence indicating that he ever entered the store to obtain permission from Mrs. Troester 
who was at the store. The jury could also reasonably infer that the police would not put out 
an A.T.L. after talking to the owner unless the car had been taken without her permission. 
The jury could infer that the elaborate attempts to locate the vehicle would not be necessary 
if defendant had permission to use the car. The jury could infer guilt by defendant's attempt 
to flee from officers. 
Finally, defendant himself testified that when he came upon the car and noticed that 
it was running, he simply "figured" it was all right to borrow the car. He did not ask. This 
testimony removes all doubt as to whether or not defendant had obtained permission to use 
the car. 
Motion for a Mistrial. Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it failed to declare a mistrial for Officer Delao's inadvertent reference to stolen checks. 
However, because the reference was isolated and inadvertent, and because the trial court 
promptly instructed the jury to disregard the statement and immediately gave a curative 
instruction, any prejudicial impact of the improper statement was neutralized. That the jury 
conscientiously applied the jury instructions is evidenced by the jury's acquittal of defendant 
on theft and conviction on the unlawful control over a motor vehicle. 
8 
r 
I H E
 E v i D E N C E WAS SUFMCIEIN 1 1 U S U F P U K l 1 ME J UK ¥ S V E R D I C T 
O F G U I L T Y F O R U N L A W F U L C O N T R O L OVER A M O T O R VEHICLE. 
Following closing arguments, defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the theft 
charge (and its lesser included offense), and now seeks reversal on appeal, on the grounds 
that lhr r< tdnioi; v MI*; nr.ii!IMIIMII I IUM.IMISII llml (IVInid.iiil did nnl Ihtvi" pmnission Iti use 
theTroesters ' car.4 k . iuo. j<J9-iG, 2 1 . Aplt. Brf. at 12. Defendant argues that the evidence 
is insufficient to establish this element because "ftlhe state [was] required to put on a li\ e 
witness *. u.Bri.cu i.. ^H.^IMU J H ^ M U wadure to appear certainly made it more 
d +,; - . * • v r i . • - - _ || Ulllll|1|l,, | I,,),!! ( d i r S U I T ' S 
case.5 
The testimony of Mr Troester established that he and his wife owned the car and that 
she was driving it ui. .».*. «.. .. AastakwwL^ v i ^ i ^ a ^ ^ . .med 
t! u . - r^M ?..- nddefen " 
challenge his testimony on appeal. Accordingly, the only i ^ u e before this Court is \vhet:__i 
or not there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could reasonably find that 
Mrs. Il mii»estc! did ill nil ;"",i .v delendjiil perm ISM ill I ' iiii" " illllin , . i r . 
'Although the trial court did not expressly dei i) the i i lotioi I, it did so ii i 1pl.Ied.l3 
s ^nt the matter to the jury. 
5Although the State intended to call Tamera Troester, R. 108: 55, for reasons not 
apparent from the transcript, the State was unable to secure her attendance and instead 
called her husband, Kenneth Troester R '<>8 121.310. 
When considering a challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate 
court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'9 State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 
1983), superseded by rule on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1997). The 
standard of appellate review is narrow and the Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,345 (Utah 1985). Id. Accordingly, the appellate 
court will sustain the jury's findings and verdict "unless the evidence is so inherently 
improbable or unsubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached the same 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780,781 (Utah 1986). 
In other words, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made," the court 
will uphold the verdict. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
A. The Evidence Presented by the State, and the Reasonable Inferences Drawn 
Therefrom, Were Sufficient to Establish That Defendant Did Not Have 
Consent to Use the Troesters' Car. 
As noted above, Mrs. Troester, who was using the vehicle when it was taken by 
defendant, did not testify at trial. However, the victim's testimony, which would have 
provided direct evidence that defendant did not have permission to take the car, was not 
necessary to prove the State's case. The testimony elicited by the State, and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from that testimony, provided more than sufficient evidence to establish 
that defendant took the vehicle without Mrs. Troester's consent. See State v. John, 586 P.2d 
10 
410, 41--12 (Utah 1978) (recognizing circumstantial evidence "as a valid niethod of 
aseeilttiiiiiijj1 lllii; 11 ill II) III 
On cross-examination, IVn. 11 oester testified that there were not times when he didn *t 
know whether or not his wife gave someone else permission to use the ear-though he 
conceded it was possible that she could allow others to dri\ e the car without first checking 
w i (III I I in in mi in I lllii1 I I in il I in i mi mi I iiiiii in llns fc Jiiiitiiih nillill in in IN leu 1 br iiiiMilfinHit lh m lain 
the verdict. However, the State's evidence was not confined to Mr. Troester's testimony. 
Ms. Reeves observed the defendant "come out of nowhere"—he did not come from 
the store, but approached i,^
 VJ ; i^ ,— Lne rear, R 108: 129. I le w alked in betweei i I\ Is. 
F ' ^ T ;1 lpai ked facing e 
store as if he were going in. R. 108: 129-30. However, defendant never went into the store. 
Instead, defendant stopped, turned around, and peered into the Troesters' car through the 
defendant noticed that the keys wc the car and the vehicle was n inning in idle the 
condition under which Mrs. Troester had left the car..6 R, 108: 125. 
6Defendant argues that statements from Mrs, I roeste i It I :li I iii ig tl i = • stat = tit: lei it to 
her husband that she left the keys in the car with the car n in: H iii ig. :ai m: i : 11: • i • :• : i isidered ii I 
connect ion with the insufficiency c la im because they cc i istiti it = III \i it : lissit I  = 1 learsay. 
Aplt. Brf at 14. However, because defendant failed to : I: \ )• : • : t ill: : • till lis t = stii :i i : ny at trial, he 
is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal absent plain error (which he 
has not alleged). See Stale v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576, 581 (Utah App. 19- •*] As such, the 
statement was before the jury and is properly considered by this Court on appeal. 
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Defendant then "really casually" walked around the Troesters' car from the rear. R. 
108:129-30. However, as he got into the Troesters' car, defendant's behavior and demeanor 
changed entirely. He became agitated or hurried. R. 108:139. He did not carefully back out 
of the parking lot. Instead, he backed up in a manner that caused the tires to squeal, without 
checking to see if anyone was behind him. R. 108: 130, 134-35. He went from casually 
looking the car over for approximately one minute, R. 108: 134, to "squealing" out as he 
backed up and drove away. Defendant's behavior was not consistent with someone who had 
permission to drive the car. 
This was in fact the inference that Ms. Reeves drew. Believing that the car had just 
been stolen, she went into the store to notify the owner and saw a woman who she "guessed" 
had "just noticed [that] her car was gone." R. 108: 130-31. When Ms. Reeves entered the 
store, someone was already on the telephone with the police. R. 108:131. Accordingly, Ms. 
Reeves then gave the police a description of defendant. R. 108: 131.. R. 108: 131. When 
Officer Delao arrived at the Circle K, he contacted Mrs. Troester who he identified as the 
victim. R. 108: 147-48. 
Moreover, the jury reasonably could infer that it was Mrs. Troester in the store who 
appeared to have "just noticed [that] her car was gone." R. 108: 131. Officer Delao then 
obtained information from Mrs. Troester, and, based on that information, he put out an 
A.T.L. on the Troesters'vehicle. R. 108:147-48. Thejury reasonably could infer that it was 
unlikely Mrs. Troester would provide the officer with information, and, based on that 
information, he would then put out an A.T.L. on the car, if Mrs. Troester had given defendant 
12 
peimi. mill In i Hit u;hiili Iitsk.id, (In jury reasonably COIK.. . .^ mtormation 
was provided and the ,A 1 I | il il \n\ ,nhc rkfnuliihl 1 J I Liu1 permission iroi I "Jis. 
Troester to take the vehicle. Indeed, the opposite inference—that Mrs. Troester authorized 
a man high on methamphetainine to take her car to the site of expected violence, leaving her 
a v: • .j^oi-^L .w juror could have drawn. 
Moreover, police were able to locate ri^ferJ * itX '•.U^I-TV . g 
the phone number that had been recently dialed on Mrs. Troester?s cell phone and matching 
that number with a corresponding address. P 108* 1 ^fM3, \ zain. the jury reasonably could 
infer ilii il li.nl I Ir. Il ' ... _,.... . aave 
had to go to such great lengths to locate the car, nor would the police assisted ' ' a 
search. This inference is strengthened by the feet that defendant had 1 ler cell phone, R. 108: 
1- . AC r;^ « ^ .vii mwi j . . ibion, she couni nave simply called him on the cell 
phone t :: detei n line I lis locati ::  i i In ::l z i J, ' 1 ic i i , 
defendant did not respond. R. 108: 150. A \galn, these facts support an inference that 
defendant did not have permission to use the veh; ' 
defendant claims that any statements made by Mrs. I roester to the officer are 
inadmissible hearsay. The officer's statement that Mrs. Troester gave him information, 
and that he subsequently put out an A.T.L. based on that information, is not hearsay. 
Officer Delao did testify that Mrs. Troester told him that, in addition to the car, a cell 
phone in the car had also been taken, R 108: 148. However,, defendant did not object to 
the admission of this hearsay statement, R. 108: 148, and therefore, the issue was not 
preserved for appeal. See Perry, 871 P.2d at 581 As such, it is evidence the jury could 
consider. 
i J 
When defendant was confronted by police, he did not cooperate with officers but 
instead fled from the officers and resisted arrest. R. 108:155-65. The jury reasonably could 
infer that defendant's flight was indicative of a guilty conscience resulting from unlawfully 
taking the car. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) (holding that "flight or 
concealment may give rise to an inference of a guilty conscience and therefore an inference 
of guilt"). 
Based on the foregoing testimony presented by the State in its case in chief, the jury 
reasonably could infer that defendant did not have Mrs. Troester's permission to use the car. 
Defendant's behavior when he first observed the car to the time he squealed out of the 
parking lot was not consistent with someone who had permission to take the car. There was 
no evidence indicating that he ever entered the store to obtain permission from Mrs. Troester 
who was at the store. The jury could also reasonably infer that the police would not put out 
an A.T.L. after talking to the owner unless the car had been taken without her permission. 
The jury could also infer that the elaborate attempts to locate the vehicle would not be 
necessary if defendant had permission to use the car. Finally, the jury could infer guilt by 
defendant's attempt to flee from officers. 
B. The Evidence Presented by Defendant Further Established that He Did Not 
Have Mrs. Troester's Consent to Use the Car. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency was not made until after closing 
arguments. Accordingly, the jury also had before it evidence presented by defendant which 
supported a jury finding that he did not have consent to use the car. Defendant himself 
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provided direct evidence that he never obtained permission to use the Troesters ' car. The 
_ ^
 l i a n g e took place on dii ectexai i in latioi iregardii igcl z fei i ::lai: it" s taking of the car: 
Defense LOUL W.. . .hen you got to tl le Circle K? 
Defendant car running, I stopped, I was thinking maybe I 
. '.. could call somebody to help but 1 didn' t know who to call 
or anything; the car running, I figured it would be okay for 
me to borrow it to go over to the house to make sure she 
was all right 1 wasn' t trying to steal :+ '-— u ~ or 
n m t h i n o I u i-. !i» * worr ied iVwint s^f 
. Counsel 5o vs nat did \ o u uo. Vou got 
,-ndant Yes, ma 'am, 
Defense L u u n . ^ 1 :i 21 e did ] • :)i 1 gc ""/ • '• ":;;-- • •' • 
•nciar: : ceeded to go over to Tiffany's house. I was calling 
her on the phone The lady had a cell phone in her car and 
when you turn,, a cell phone on, i t 's got a phone number to 
the phone, on her phone. I was trying to call the lady on 
her own number on the phone, I kept getting a busy 
number, I was so high, I didn ' t realize that I was calling 
her own number on her pay phone-o r her cell p h o n e . . . . 
R 108: 237 (emphasis added), 
1 * *i^;. .a- . ^ ^ n i i u i ; } , i:^iwiore, estaDiisiic:> u , ^ nc J i J ,-»M uutain permission 
to use the car. He did not 
approached the store, he saw the Troesters ' car running in idle and so he stopped before ever 
entering the store, i ic Unjugiii uc could call someone, but then again, he did not know who 
II11 mil Instead, IK , a* 1 d ill \ lUiili] I 1 i . i ' I  IllMmon ' lln, i,,n II'"" III IK, J" i / In liyiiri1 
means "to believe," as in he "didn ' t figure it w 01 lid happe t i ' W reb sh u ' s I "", f < ii Rh >er s/< h • 
University Dictionary; 476 (1988) He did not know it would be okay because he did not ask 
Mrs. Troester. Had he asked her, he would have known whether or not it would have been 
okay to use the car. Defendant simply took the car without asking. His failure to 
affirmatively testify that he received Mrs. Troester's permission to use the car reasonably and 
logically leads to the inference that he did not do so. Having testified, defendant "cannot 
escape the consequences of any fact testified to by him or of his omission to deny or explain 
any fact tending to establish his guilt which was testified to by others.9' State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
Moreover, defendant's girlfriend testified that she was scared, even frantic, as a result 
of threats she was receiving on her voice mail that day. R. 108:213-17. This, after all, was 
an emergency page and defendant needed to save his girlfriend. R. 108:236. He called Ms. 
Nelson on the cell phone and instructed her to stay inside the house, to lock the doors, and 
to not answer the door. R. 108: 237. Yet, upon arriving at the Salt Lake residence, instead 
of seeking protection from defendant, Ms. Nelson's primary concern was the fact that 
defendant had taken a car. When he went into the house to check on her, Ms. Nelson "started 
screaming at [him] for having somebody else's car" and she told him that they "need[ed] to 
get the damn thing back." R. 108: 238. This behavior is not consistent with the volatile 
situation described by defendant and Ms. Nelson. 
Moreover, Ms. Nelson testified that after defendant checked on her welfare, she asked 
him where he got the car. R. 108: 218. Defendant responded that he got it "from Circle K." 
Id. Such a response does not support an inference that he borrowed the car from Mrs. 
Troester, but rather the opposite inference that he took it from a Circle K without the owner's 
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knowledge. Had he obtained Mrs. Troester's permission, he would likely have told Ms. 
Nelson (hat iir h rrowed il In,nil I"1 Jr.. I roester, not ;;iui U1 gu» .• iroin a u k i c i " u~ 
told him that they needed to return the vehiVlf *l^>iui • 
paperwork identifying the owner's address. Id. Again, had he borrowed the car, he would 
likely know to whom and how to return the car. 
i L.'* ..J. iereiicL\> ;:.J. wu;* DO drawn 
therefrom, together with the testimony oi defend:) M ' ' ' • lV< nil 
to support the jury's verdict. It cannot be said that "the evidence is so uihuLcntly improbable 
or unsubstantial that a reason** .* person could not have reached the same determination 
including reasonable inferences," from which the ji iry could reasonah1 • find that defendant 
did not have Mrs. Troester's consent to use the car. Booker, "09 P.2d at 345. Accordingl) r, 
jphoiu Lw ,^is. * 
II. : ^ I I U A L L u l R r AC'I ED WI'I 'HIN I I S
 D I S C R E T i O N WHEN n 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE 
WITNESS INADVERTENTLY REFERRED TO DEFENDANT'S 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN CHECKS. 
Prior to trial, the court granted m par! dciuiudm":* motion in limine to introduce 
evidence of prior Ivi 1 iii t\ \ Iiin li appak'nll'i iiiii liiiinl 1 . in , n f u r i m I  > J o ' l t III i l i u k ' i 
recovered from defendant in a search following his arrest.8 R. 33,108:8-9, l °v ^-Hrr-" 
8The ruling, which was referenced by defendant's trial counsel i -hiccup .J 
by the State or otherwise corrected by the court, was apparently not mauc un uic record. 
SeeR. 108: 193, 198-200. 
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course of the trial, however, Officer Delao inadvertently made reference to the stolen checks. 
R. 108: 167. The trial court sustained defendant's objection, ordered that the statement be 
stricken, and gave a curative instruction. R. 108: 167-69. At the close of the State's case, 
defendant moved for a mistrial on this ground, but the trial court denied the motion. R. 108: 
193-203. Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for 
a mistrial. Aplt. Brf. at 16. As explained below, however, the trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 369, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974). 
"If in exercising its discretion, the [trial] court concludes that the incident probably did not 
prejudice the jury, . . .the court should deny the motion." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1230-31. 
In a recent decision, the Utah Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is the trial court's 
responsibility to determine if the incident rises to the level requiring a mistrial, and it is the 
trial court which must decide if an can incident may have or probably influenced the jury, to 
the prejudice of [the defendant].'" State v. Cardall, No. 970433, 1999 WL 318812, at *4 
(Utah May 21,1999) (citations omitted; brackets in original). Accordingly, this Court "will 
not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion." 
Robertson,932?2d 1219,1230 (Utah 1997). The appellate court "review[s] such a decision 
with just deference because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the 
impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings, and this is especially 
so when what actually occurred is in dispute." Id. at 1231. 
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I><rfrndmImi I.IIIIIIIK1,, tiiuil Hie luili " iiti* i m.ljdiige between llic |»iosccutor and Officer 
Delao warrants a mistrial: 
Prosecutor Did1 • d^ anythi* • ' 
Witness 
Prosecutor \ou locate0 
Witness >^  ... \w\.'. ,- .- . * wi the suspe .^ mug^; 
" - ^a- ,i L; ^J,, jrmic needle >J>A\ ;:. : ........ pocket, 
- .. ,he hypodermic needle was next to him. The-
according to my report here, there's-there's two books of 
stolen checks and a yellowish— 
Defense Counsel Your Honor, object IV-I i he-if we could have a motion 
utside the-the-there were no stolen checks, that -he-the 
officer was instructed not to sa) anything about stolen 
checks, 
p rejudice from an improper reference to another crime can be sufficiently cured 
796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App 1.990) Accordingly, the trial court immediately ordered tl lat 
the statement be stricken, instructing the jury as follows: 
Members oi , that is not charged nor relevant nor material 
in this case, and one of the functions that I have is to insure that the-as the 
evidence gets past me to yen >! ** ; Kuh w i • .IN- ™\^ .~t ^A ~..t 
prejudicial. 
Sometimes, extrinsic things get said that really aren't germane or 
n M , , n Dnt to the charges before you and-and reference to these other materials 
isn't legally relevant with respect to the charges before us today, so 
1 m feuiiig to ask you to disregard any reference, utterance made by this or any 
other witness to matters that are not legally pertinent, specifically the last 
statement regarding some checks which were-may or may not have been 
found and may or may not have been stolen or whatever, that h^ no bearing 
19 
whatsoever in this case and you're just to disregard that utterance in it's 
entirety and I'll order it be stricken. Okay? 
R. 108: 167-68. 
Defendant argues that this curative instruction was not merely inadequate; he argues 
that the instruction did more damage by emphasizing the improper testimony. Aplt. Brf. at 
21. However, were the Court to follow defendant's reasoning, rarely, if at all, would a 
curative instruction be sufficient. As the Utah Supreme Court recently observed: 
There is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon to affirm an 
attorney's objection and instruct the jury to disregard an improper question or 
an improper answer a witness has given. Such instructions are curative 
instructions that trial judges routinely give during the presentation of evidence 
as well as at the end of trial, before the jury deliberates. If a trial judge could 
not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Utah 1998). 
The State does not dispute that reference to the stolen checks was contrary to the trial 
court's ruling. However, the prosecutor only asked the question to establish defendant's 
possession of methamphetamine, an element of the charge for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance. See R. 72. Therefore, Officer Delao's reference to stolen checks was 
inadvertent and isolated. R. 108: 200. The State did not exploit the statement in closing 
argument. R. 108: 287-98, 306-08. Moreover, the instruction provided the jury with a 
modest explanation for the court's ruling without unduly emphasizing the statement. 
Consistent with defense counsel's position, the trial court did not emphasize the statement 
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further with an additional curative instruction at the end of trial.9 See R. 108:202. Although 
curative instructions are not a "cure-all," the appellate court will "'normally presume that a 
jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to 
it, unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the 
court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
"devastating" to the defendant.'" Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 767 n.8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n.8 (1987)). 
On his motion for a mistrial, defense counsel argued that the jury may very well 
reason that defendant's possession of stolen checks is evidence that he's a thief who never 
intended to return the Troesters'car. R. 108:196-97. Similarly, on appeal, defendant argues 
that the jury likely assumed defendant was a bad person and that reference to the stolen 
checks might have improperly convinced the jury that the car was also stolen. Aplt. Brf. at 
20-21. However, that the jury followed the curative instruction is evidenced by its acquittal 
of defendant on the theft charge and its verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense. 
Although the jury rejected defendant's justification defense, R. 108: 69, it clearly 
accepted defendant's position that he did not intend to permanently deprive the Troesters' 
of the vehicle as required for a theft conviction. Far from demonstrating an "overwhelming 
probability" that the jury could not follow the court's instructions, defendant's acquittal on 
the theft charge was proof positive of "the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, including 
9However, the trial court did give general instructions to the jury that it should not 
consider any evidence stricken by the court. R. 49, 52, 108: 268, 271. 
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its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272. The jury's 
verdict demonstrates that the jury did not conclude that because he stole checks, defendant 
also stole the car. Had the jury so concluded, it would have returned a verdict of guilty for 
theft of a motor vehicle. Therefore, the officer's inadvertent reference to the stolen checks 
was not "so prejudicial and devastating to [defendant] as to vitiate the mitigating effect of 
the court's curative instruction." Id. at 273 (footnote omitted). 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions on appeal, the State does 
not request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion be issued. 
Respectfully submitted this ZH day of June, 1999. 
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